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NOTES
and statutes requiring no guilty knowledge. It is further sug-
gested that the contrasting of passive omission with active com-
mission or overt action is not a step back into the old area of
nonfeasance and malfeasance, but an explanatory necessity.
This definition is not employed by the majority as a dividing
line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality. It is im-
portant in that passive and innocent omissions are more subject
to arbitrary administration of the ordinance. Punishment for
an innocent and passive omission serves to magnify the unrea-
sonableness of the ordinance. In summary, it would appear that
the decision in the instant case results in no modification of
prior jurisprudence. It may, however, be valuable in determin-
ing the due process limitations the Court will impose on local
exercise of the police power in an area of exception to the deeply
ingrained rule that "ignorance of the law will not excuse. '2 4
Lamar E. Ozley, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - SUFFICIENCY OF STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
Two 1957 Louisiana Supreme Court decisions dealt with the
sufficiency of statutory definitions of crimes. In the first case
defendants, inmates of Angola, broke out of the dormitory in
which they were confined and were recaptured while still on the
prison grounds. They were convicted under the Louisiana simple
escape statute' which broadly defines simple escape as the "in-
tentional departure of a person from lawful custody . .. or from
any place where lawfully detained." Defendants charged that
the statute was unconstitutional in that its meaning was vague
because the words "lawful custody" and "place where lawfully
detained" were not sufficiently defined. On appeal, held, convic-
tion affirmed. The general terms which adequately define a
crime are a sufficient definition. The simple escape statute is
not unconstitutional for vagueness because the meaning of the
questioned terms can be taken according to their fair import, in
the common meaning, and in connection with the context. State
v. Marsh, 233 La. 238, 96 So.2d 643 (1957).
In the second case defendant, a legislator and employee of a
paint store which had procured state contracts, was indicted
under R.S. 48:422 which purported to make it a crime for a
24. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910).
1. LA. R.S. 14:110 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 122, § 1.
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member of the legislature to be "in any way interested" in con-
tracts for highways and public works. Defendant filed a motion
to quash the indictment on the ground that the statute was un-
constitutional for reasons of vagueness. The trial court sus-
tained the motion. On appeal, held, affirmed. A statute must in-
form an offender of the nature of his acts. State v. Murtes, 232
La. 486, 94 So.2d 446 (1957).
The sufficiency and validity of statutory definitions of
crimes seem to be a common problem. 2 In Louisiana all crimes
are statutory, and the legislature must define them in sufficient
terms.8 The courts have frequently been called upon to deter-
mine whether or not criminal statutes have been sufficient in
definition to meet the constitutional requirement that "the ac-
cused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion against him."4 This requirement is interpreted by the Su-
preme Court to mean that the statute must define the conduct
denounced with sufficient precision and clarity that a person of
ordinary intelligence may readily discern whether his conduct
is criminal or not.5
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 19426 opened a new series
of litigations as to the validity of the crimes therein defined.
The new Code combined numerous forms of related criminal
activity, previously specifically defined, into general articles
which denounced the major activity.7 For example, Article 67
combined more than fifty separate stealing crimes8 into a single
crime of "theft."9 State v. Pete10 upheld the validity of an indict-
ment under the new theft article, and in effect gave judicial
sanction to the Criminal Code policy of defining crimes in gen-
eral terms rather than by specification of each of the separate
2. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES § 29 (5th ed. 1952) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 541 (1957).
3. LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950) ; La. Acts 1804, c. 50, p. 416; State v. Robinson, 143
La. 543, 78 So. 933 (1918).
4. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
5. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948) ; State v. Kraft, 214
La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
6. La. Acts 1942, No. 43, incorporated as Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950.
7. Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 6 (1942).
8. LA. R.S. ANN. 14:67, Reporter's Comment (West 1950).
9. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950) defines "theft" as follows: "Theft is the misappro-
priation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without
the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudu-
lent conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other perma-
nently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essen-
tial."
10. 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944).
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forms. Similarly the "gambling" article" was upheld in the case
of State v. Varnado,'2 in which the Supreme Court held that the
word "gambling" was a sufficiently defined and understandable
term to serve as the basis for a criminal law, and that it was
neither necessary nor feasible to enumerate each of the many
forms which this vice might take. Other general terms which
have been held sufficient in this area are "prospect,"'1 3 "mechan-
ical device,' 1 4 "sexually indecent print,' 5 and "lewd dancing."' 0
In brief, it would appear that a statute using general terms will
be valid if the terms employed have a generally understood
meaning and are used in that sense. On the other hand statutory
definitions based on such phrases as "indecent assaults,' 7 "in-
decent print," Is "immoral act,""' "immoral purpose, '20 and "sat-
isfactory explanation,"' 2' have been held unconstitutional because
of vagueness. The line drawn is a nebulous one, but the basic
test is whether the statutory language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices.2
The decisions in the instant cases were consistent with the
pattern established by the prior Louisiana jurisprudence. The
simple escape statute in the Marsh case deals with a type of of-
fense where all persons have a general knowledge of the nature
of the criminal activity denounced. The key phrases "lawful cus-
tody" and "lawfully detained" seem to be words with commonly
understood meanings rather than words of art. In this case the
court upheld the sufficiency of general terms which clearly de-
fine and denounce the act punished. The Murtes case involved a
criminal definition which was fraught with uncertainty. It at-
tempted to make criminal certain corrupt practices by public
officials. This is not a field where common knowledge of crim-
inality abounds. In such an area of law the line must be drawn
11. LA. R.S. 14:90 (1950) defines "gambling" as follows: "Gambling is the
intentional conducting, or directly assisting in the conducting, as a business, of any
game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything
of value in order to realize a profit."
12. 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1944).
13. State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140 (1948).
14. Ibid.
15. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392 (1954) ; State v. Esposito, 226 La.
114, 75 So.2d 27 (1954).
16. State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
17. State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1913).
18. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
19. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So.2d 329 (1948).
20. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947).
21. Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So.2d 308 (1954).
22. Connaly v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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with clarity. Yet the terms "in any way interested" did not
specify what type interests were prohibited or how direct an
interest would have to be. Thus it seems the court was correct
in overturning the statute.
Chas. A. Traylor, II
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SHORT FORM
INDICTMENT
For years, Louisiana, as many other states, had been plagued
by the once useful but now technical and anachronistic long form
indictment.' In 1928, when the Louisiana Legislature adopted a
Code of Criminal Procedure, a short form indictment was pro-
vided for in Article 235.2 The purpose was to eliminate the com-
plex and technical form of the common law charge for the more
widely known and re-occurring crimes and to provide an accu-
rate but concise form of indictment.8 If the accused desired fur-
ther information concerning the offense charged, he could, prior
to arraignment, call for a bill of particulars, which the judge
could not arbitrarily refuse to grant.4
Immediately after its adoption, the constitutionality of the
short form indictment as established in Article 235 was chal-
lenged on the ground that it did not inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him." In all of these
cases, the validity of the short form was sustained.8
1. Comment, 6 LoUISIANA LAW REviEW 461 (1945). The long form indict-
ment developed at a time when many relatively minor crimes carried the penalty
of capital punishment. The technical requirements of the long form were used to
mitigate this harshness. However, as punishment became less severe, these re-
quirements no longer served this purpose, but to the contrary, provided technical
loopholes for the accused. See Note, 17 LoUISIANA LAW REvIEW 232, 233 (1956).
2. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950). This article provides that "the following forms
of indictment may be used in the cases in which they are applicable." For ex-
ample, in the case of an indictment for attempted murder, the form is: "Attempt
............................ ... A.B. attempted to murder C.D."
8. See Bennett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944, 6 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW 16
(1944).
4. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950). The Louisiana Supreme Court has often said that,
when a short form indictment is used, the defendant is entitled of right to a bill
of particulars, and the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation is fully protected thereby. State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46
So.2d 262 (1950) ; State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So.2d 622 (1949) ; State v.
Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785 (1948).
There are certain practical limitations on the right of the accused to a bill of
particulars. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 457 (1952). See also
Note, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 232 (1956).
5. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides that an accused "be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation."
6. See State v. Holmes, 223 La. 397, 65 So.2d 890 (1953) (simple burglary)
